

[REDACTED]
Classification

1. Problem. Recommend a procedure which will provide adequate verification that the USSR has in fact removed offensive equipment from Cuba.

2. Background.

3. Frame of Reference

a. The USSR is expected to have complied fully with the commitments undertaken in paragraphs c, d, and f above.

b. In addition, it is expected that the USSR will have
complied [REDACTED]

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complied with the position of the U.S. Government that IL28s are also to be removed from Cuba as offensive equipment.

c. The commitment to remove missiles is considered to include such as appear on the list at the end of this message. the removal of/associated items/~~scud launching pads, trucked depots, mobile transport vehicles, missile launch sites, underground facilities, missile fuel tanks, railroads, chemical plants, power generating stations, electronic equipment, industrial~~ was

d. Photos of weapon crates or empty missile sites can be falsified as to time or location and therefore, although of value, are not foolproof.

e. The U.S. Government ~~must~~ needs to determine how Soviets propose to demonstrate no nuclear warheads or bombs remain in Cuba.

f. The question of fighter-bombers, KOMAR motor torpedo boats and missile fuel has not been answered.

4. Required Verification in Cuban Ports

a. Inspection of equipment prior to loading is much to be preferred over inspection after loading on board ship.

b. Although from the standpoint of verification it is preferable that inspection of all components should take place prior to crating, nevertheless, reasonable assurance of removal (which gives consideration to the concern of the USSR re espionage) can be achieved without inspection before crating.

c. Sufficient

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c. Sufficient uncrating should be accomplished to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and ~~film~~ photography.

5. Required Verification at Sea

a. Loading of Soviet ships will be carried out in such fashion that visual inspection of each crate is feasible. As an alternative, there could be partial unloading at another designated port to allow visual ~~inspx~~ inspection. In either event a loading plan for each outgoing vessel will be provided to facilitate inspection. This is to be a detailed plan giving location and identify of offensive weapons components.

b. Soviet ships will be instructed to rendezvous with U.S. inspection vessels and to have completed appropriate uncrating in advance of rendezvous. In the event weather makes such uncrating infeasible, a delay in time or change of rendezvous will be signalled by the inspecting ship.

c. Inspection on Board

1. This form of inspection is much to be preferred over inspection from along side and should be requested.

2. If the USSR has located any of its offensive equipment below deck, on board access to these ships will be mandatory in order to obtain adequate verification.

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(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography. (There must also be sufficient uncrewing of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein.) ~~Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography. (There must also be sufficient uncrewing of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein.)~~

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d. Inspection from Along Side

(1) It will not be possible to eliminate all possibility of spoofing without physical inspection on board. However, reasonable assurance can be obtained by alongside inspection, when coupled with other indications; to permit the USG to accept this mode as a fall back position.

(2) If the US is limited to inspection from along side a vessel, all items of offensive equipment must be located on or above main deck.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit photographs and visual viewing, in order to identify from among the components listed on the attached inventory, the specific component involved. (There must also be sufficient uncrating of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein).

(4) Hovering helicopters above the inspected vessel must be authorized in order to permit more comprehensive visual and photographic coverage.

6. Expertise. Each inspecting US Navy ship and boarding party will contain experts able to identify components of offensive equipment.

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A LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT SPECIAL MISSILE EQUIPMENT

TO BE USED IN MAKING UP A CHECK-OFF LIST

1. Missiles and missile transporter
2. Tracked prime mover for transporter
3. Erector vehicles
4. Fuel tank trailers
5. Wheeled prime movers for fuel vehicles
6. Oxydizer tank trailers
7. Tracked prime movers for oxydizer trailers
8. Launch stands
9. Power generators
10. Electronics vans
11. Theodolites on Pedistals

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END

Note: Passed to Principle Officers Executive Committee

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